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Firm Level Productivity under Imperfect 




This article examines the role of the interaction between product market and labor market 
imperfections in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG). Embedding Dobbelaere 
and Mairesse’s (2009) generalization of Hall’s (1990) approach, allowing for the possibility 
that wages are determined according to an efficient bargaining process between employers 
and employees, we correct estimated TFPG for possible biases arising from labor market 
imperfections. Our analysis contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we 
propose a new empirical measure of TFPG which takes into account possible biases coming 
from imperfect competition on both labor and output markets, whereas Dobbelaere and 
Mairesse (2009) focus on the decomposition of the Solow residual. Second, in contrast to 
most of the literature following Hall’s approach, we estimate market power including the user 
cost of capital stock. Third, we measure the sensitivity of TFPG to an alternative specification 
of competition based on relative profits. Using a large Dutch firm-level panel database over 
the period 1989-2005, we find that workers’ unions power, and in general rigidities of the 
labor market, affect firms’ marginal cost, and, consequently, the markups. Moreover, taking 
into account variable returns to scale and imperfect competition in the output market translate 
into increased TFPG, while accounting for labor market bargaining power leads to lower 
TFPG. Next, the investigation of our empirical relationship between the price-cost margin and 
an alternative specification of imperfect competition of the output market (profit elasticity) as 
a sensitivity analysis of the TFPG shows that adding more structure to the competition 
measure does not affect the level of productivity change. 
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The analysis and measurement of productivity performance has attracted a
great deal of attention ever since Solow (1957) decomposed the growth in
output into the growth of inputs and a residual-based productivity term.
A fascinating approach followed in the literature is to correct the Solow
residual for departures from perfect competition, estimating mark-ups over
marginal cost, scale elasticities and shadow prices, and modifying the formula
for the residual (Hall, 1986, 1988, and 1990). Hall’s approach starts from the
result that the Solow residual is no longer equal to the rate of technical change
when there is imperfect competition in product markets, but that the two
are related by an equation which now includes a component involving the
markup of price over marginal cost.
The analysis of imperfect competition in labor markets, led by Dickens
and Katz (1987), has also received great attention and given rise to a large
literature in labor economics, but this literature has typically remained sep-
arate from that on imperfect competition in product markets. Only a few
studies (Bughin, 1996; Cr´ epon et al., 2002; Dobbelaere, 2004; Dobbelaere
and Mairesse, 2009) have considered the possibility of imperfections in both
product and factor markets, by taking into account that wages are no longer
exogenous.
Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009), following Cr´ epon et al. (2002), assume
that workers have a degree of market power when negotiating with the ﬁrm
over wages and employment. Under this conjecture, they show that product
and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities
in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold.
First, we propose a new empirical measure of Total Factor Productivity
Growth (TFPG) which takes into account possible biases coming from im-
perfect competition on both labor and output markets, whereas the analyses
of Cr´ epon et al. (2002) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009) focus on the
decomposition of the Solow residual, to show that it can be decomposed into
a mark-up of price over marginal cost component, a scale factor, a factor
reﬂecting union bargaining power, and a rate of technical change.
Second, in contrast to most of the literature following Hall’s approach,
we estimate market power including the user cost of capital stock.
Third, we measure the sensitivity of TFPG to an alternative speciﬁcation
of competition based on relative proﬁts.
To our knowledge, the impact of the interaction between product market
and labor market imperfections on TFPG has not been investigated before.
As the potential biases from assuming perfect competition in product
3markets have long been recognized, our paper implements the Dobbelaere
and Mairesse (2009) approach to correct estimated TFPG for biases aris-
ing from labor market imperfections. Taking advantage of a rich ﬁrm-level
dataset of 22 Dutch manufacturing industries over the period 1989-2005, we
investigate possible changes in TFPG, allowing for both labor and output
market imperfections. We ﬁnd that only in few sectors ﬁrms set their prices
above their marginal costs, while workers are bargaining over their salaries in
the majority of industries. At the manufacturing level, our results, compared
with the Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009) analysis on French manufacturing
enterprises, indicate less imperfect competition on the output market (the
price-cost markup is found to be 1.06 versus 1.17 for French ﬁrms) and more
imperfect competition in the labor market (workers’ bargaining power is 0.61
versus 0.44 for French data). Moreover, we ﬁnd that deviating from the as-
sumption of perfect markets implies a possible heterogeneity in production
technologies and variable returns to scale within the 22 industries. We also
ﬁnd that, for many of these industries, ﬁrms’ pricing behavior tends to be
directly associated with the characteristics of their production technology, in-
cluding changes in eﬃciency which translate into productivity growth. Our
ﬁnding is in line with well known models of endogenous growth (for exam-
ple, Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
As a matter of fact, a decrease of the level of product market competition
has a positive eﬀect on productivity growth, by augmenting the monopoly
rents that reward new innovation. Furthermore, connected to the innovation
process and labor market imperfections, as in Aghion and Howitt (1994), we
ﬁnd that labor market imperfection yields a lower productivity growth rate.
Firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks due to product innovations calling
for labor force reallocations. As the rigidity of the labor market does not
allow ﬁrms from adjusting their labor factor, labor market imperfection then
causes a lower innovation rate.
Next, as a measure of the sensitivity of TFPG to diﬀerent competition
measures, we derive an alternative speciﬁcation of competition based on rela-
tive proﬁts, as the price-cost markup may not fully describe possible eﬀects of
ineﬃciencies in production (Boone et al. 2005, 2007). Therefore, we compare
the traditional markup measure to the proﬁt elasticity and other measures
of competition, like the Herﬁndahl index. The resulting ”adjusted markup”
does not add to the previously speciﬁed model any relevant information nei-
ther on the market structure, nor on the TFPG.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a TFPG
measure that allows for market power and time-varying economies of scale,
and use the traditional markup as measure for competition, but corrected for
imperfect competition in the labor market. Section 3 describes the data and
4reports results on market imperfection parameters. In Section 4 we report
and concisely discuss results for the TFPG measure discussed in Section 2.
In Section 5 we compare the markup derived in Section 2 with a competition
measure based on relative proﬁts. In the ﬁnal section we conclude with some
policy implications.
2 TFPG based on the markup as a measure
of competition
Following Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009), we derive the estimating equation
for a setting of three inputs (capital, labor, and intermediate goods) under
imperfect competition in the goods and labor markets.
Gross output, Yit, relates to three speciﬁc inputs as follows:
Yit = AitFi(Kit,Lit,Mit) i = 1,2,...N t = 1,...,T, (1)
where Kit denotes capital, Lit labor, and Mit intermediate goods, the latter
consisting of materials and energy, for ﬁrm i at period t. Ait is deﬁned as
TFP1 and Fi(·) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree θit, so that growth in
output can be decomposed into growth in technology and inputs by logarith-
mic diﬀerentiation of production function in equation (1) (see also equation




























Following the McDonald and Solow (1981) eﬃcient bargaining model, in
which both wage and employment are bargained between ﬁrms and their
workers, it can be shown that the wage of workers is determined at a level
which is higher than the ﬁrm’s marginal revenue of labor, i.e., ∂ lnYit/∂ lnLikt =
WiktLikt/YitPit(Yt)(1−ℓit) (Wit is the negotiated wage, Pit(Yt) is the market
price as a function of aggregate output, and ℓit is the Lerner index, see equa-
tion (23) in Appendix A). Hence, workers in ﬁrms with market power on the
output market can earn wages that are much higher than the competitive
industry wage level.
Introducing the nominal input prices Rit, Wit, and Zit as ﬁrm i’s rental
price of capital, wage rate, and unit price for intermediate goods, respectively,
the eﬃcient bargaining model can be summarized as follows.
1MFP (Multi-Factor Productivity) is sometimes used interchangeably with TFP, even
if there is a slight diﬀerence between what they may include. Indeed, taking into account
all the factors inﬂuencing output levels can be unrealistic, therefore MFP may be a more
appropriate term to use. However, the term TFP continues to be used more widely.
5The workers in the ﬁrm bargain with the ﬁrm over both the levels of em-
ployment Lit and of the wage Wit. According to McDonald and Solow (1981)
the workers’ objective in their eﬃcient bargaining model can be speciﬁed in
two alternative ways, i.e., either as the workers’ (or the union’s) aggregate
gain from employment, Lit(Wit −W it), or, taking account of the unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, as LitWit +W it (Nit −Lit), where W it is the reservation wage
(i.e. the theoretical wage valid on an imperfectly competitive output market
and a perfectly competitive labor market), Wit the negotiated wage, and Nit
is the labor supply. McDonald and Solow (1981) judge the ﬁrst speciﬁcation
as the most appropriate one for real life. As a matter of fact, the unem-
ployment beneﬁts may vary in magnitude, duration, and eligibility (Bean
1994a); therefore, similarly to Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009), we advocate
McDonald and Solow’s (1981) suggestion.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its short run proﬁt, given by the
diﬀerence between the total revenue and the total costs, i.e., as Pit(Yt)Yit −
WitLit − RitKit − ZitMit.
The eﬃcient bargaining model can be written as a (multiplicative) weighted





Lit(Wit − W it )
]ϕit [Pit(Yt)Yit − WitLit − RitKit − ZitMit]
1−ϕit
where ϕit ∈ [0,1] is the degree of workers’ bargaining power.
The best-known formal solution to this eﬃcient bargaining model is Nash’s








Having the equilibrium reservation wage, we can express the elasticity of
labor θiLt as (see the last equation of Appendix B):
θiLt = µitsiLt − ϕitµit + ϕitθit, (3)
where sikt denotes the share of the cost of input k in the total production
value of ﬁrm i, siLt is the share of the cost of labor, and θit is the returns to
scale parameter.
2The complete derivation of the eﬃcient bargaining model is provided in Appendix B.
6Firm i’s elasticities of output with respect to capital, θiKt, labor, θiLt, and


















= θiMt = µitsiMt, (6)
so that only when the technology is constant returns to scale and the output
and labor markets are perfectly competitive, the factor elasticities will be
equal to the observed input shares. Due to the imperfect competition on the
labor market, establishing the relationship θit =
∑Ji
k=1 θikt = µit
∑Ji
k=1 sikt =
µitsit, suggested by Hall (1990), is no longer valid. Indeed, adding the right





(sit − ϕit), (7)
also depending on the labor market bargaining elasticity, ϕit (note that if
ϕit = 0 equation (7) can be rewritten as θit = µitsit).
After an appropriate logarithmic diﬀerentiation, we substitute the output
elasticities (4)-(6) into equation (2) and taking account of the production
function in equation (1) and the corrected scale elasticity in equation (7), we
solve for the TFPG rates ∆ait from the resulting output growth equation:
∆yit = µitsiKt∆kit + (µitsiLt − ϕitµit + ϕitθit)∆lit + µitsiMt∆mit + ∆ait
= µit(siKt∆kit + siLt∆lit + siMt∆mit) + µit
ϕit
(1 − ϕit)
(sit − 1)∆lit + ∆ait
where lower-case letters denote variables expressed in logarithms.
This equation is derived, as in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009), without as-
suming a constant returns to scale technology or perfect competition neither
in the output market, nor in the labor market. However, Dobbelaere and
Mairesse (2009) end up with a diﬀerent expression, because they avoid the
computation of the user cost of capital, by estimating an (average) elasticity
of scale θ or by assuming approximately constant returns to scale (θ = 1)
(Cr´ epon et al., 2002).
7Deﬁning ∆xit ≡ siKt∆kit +siLt∆lit +siMt∆mit and µitϕit/(1−ϕit) ≡ γit,
we can rewrite our estimating equation in a compact form:3
∆yit = µit∆xit + γit(sit − 1)∆lit + ∆ait (10)
where the bargaining elasticity satisﬁes ϕit = γit/(γit + µit).
We assume that the Hicks-neutral technological progress is a random
variable such that ﬁrm i’s growth rate in period t consists of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
growth rate, ai, and a period-speciﬁc growth rate, δt, which captures the
macroeconomic shock that is common across industries in the same period,
plus a white noise, uit. Therefore TFPG ≡ ∆ait = ai + δt + uit. Moreover,
productivity shocks uit, such as positive technology shocks, might aﬀect the
level of factor inputs. It is indeed a plausible assumption that the composite
error ∆ait includes an unobservable component which is taken into account
in the ﬁrm’s information set before input choices are made. The existence of
such components raises the possibility that the input choices are correlated
with uit. Hence, we treat all ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables as potentially endogenous.
Under the proﬁt-maximizing approach, provided that the ﬁrm’s percep-
tions of the elasticities of demand remain unchanged, the markup would
remain constant over time (µi). Once a ﬁrm has discovered a markup of
price over marginal costs which serves its purposes, it is quite likely that it
will maintain that markup (Coutts et al., 1978).4 The constancy over time
3Without having reliable data on the share of capital, siKt, model (10) can be rewrit-
ten using Hall’s (1990) original decomposition of the Solow residual. Deﬁning the Solow
residual for three inputs, denoted by qit, as the diﬀerence between the output growth rate
and the input share weighted average of the input growth rates:
qit ≡ ∆yit − siLt∆lit − siMt∆mit − (1 − siLt − siMt)∆kit, (8)
we can substitute the (ﬁrst) output growth equation in (10) with the elasticity of capital
θiKt = µitsiKt replaced by θit − θiLt − θiMt = θit − (µitsiLt − ϕitµit + ϕitθit) − µitsiMt
herein, so that for ∆xit ≡ (∆lit − ∆kit)siLt + (∆mit − ∆kit)siMt, the Solow residual (8)
can be rewritten as:
qit = ∆ait + (µit − 1)∆xit + (θit − 1)∆kit − ϕit(µit − θit)(∆lit − ∆kit). (9)
Hence, the often very volatile ﬁrm-level output growth should no longer be explained
according to (10) but the much smoother Solow residual could be explained according to
(9), again with TFPG decomposed as ∆ait = ai + δt + uit.
4A supplementary estimation has been carried out for the time-varying markups µit



















Parameter heterogeneity across industries is modeled as stochastic variation by perform-
ing Swamy’s (1970) random-coeﬃcients linear regression model. A comparison between
8does not rule out the possibility for the structural parameters µit and ϕit to
vary across ﬁrms.5
In this paper, we are going to apply model (10) on yearly ﬁrm level data
for the Netherlands.
3 Data and results
We extract data from Statistics Netherlands for the years 1989-2005. The
output and the input variables are deﬁned as follows. As an output measure,
we use the value of gross output (PitYit) of each ﬁrm i. Labor (Lit) refers to
the number of employees in each ﬁrm for each year,6 collected in September
of that year. The corresponding wages (Wit) include the total labor costs
(gross wages plus salaries and social contributions) before taxes. The costs
of intermediate inputs (ZitMit) include costs of energy, intermediate materials
and services. The user costs of capital stock (RitKit) are calculated as the
sum of the depreciation of ﬁxed assets and the interest charges.
We use a two-digit NACE deﬂator of ﬁxed tangible assets calculated by
Statistics Netherlands in order to compute the volume index of capital stock
(with net capital growth ∆kit). The nominal gross output and intermediate
inputs are deﬂated with the appropriate price indices from the input-output
tables available at the NACE rev. 1 two-digits sector classiﬁcation.7
The data extracted from the Production Survey (PS) constitutes a highly
unbalanced panel data (with a minimum of 1259 ﬁrms in 1994 and a maxi-
mum of 6277 enterprises in 1997) with 73427 observations spanning over 16
years and over 22 industries. For some ﬁrms, we observed negative correla-
tion between the capital growth rate and the output growth. As a matter
of fact, if the ﬁrm produces non-tangible goods, even if capital assets are
growing, the physical output is decreasing as it acquires more technology,
constant and time-varying markups shows that variation over time does not aﬀect the size
or the pattern of TFPG. Results are not reported here, but available upon request.
5Due to the generally scarce number of time observations per ﬁrm, we will estimate the
parameters µit and ϕit as if they were constant over time and across ﬁrms. The eﬀects
of such aggregation may result in a misspeciﬁcation of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc growth rate, ai.
Therefore, in Subsection 3.2 we will consider a more appropriate level of aggregation
(industry-level).
6For each enterprise, jobs are added and adjusted for part-time and duration factors,
resulting in number of man/years expressed as Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)(Source:
Statistics Netherlands)
7NACE Rev. 1 is a 2-digit activity classiﬁcation which was drawn up in 1990. It is a
revision of the General Industrial Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities within the Euro-
pean Communities, known by the acronym NACE and originally published by Eurostat
in 1970.
9which allows the enterprise to reduce the output volume. Since our speciﬁca-
tion of a production function is meant to represent manufacturing ﬁrms only,
we exclude this type of ﬁrms.8 Moreover, for the estimates, we only include
ﬁrms for which we have at least two consecutive observations for all variables,
ending up with 7161 ﬁrms. Throughout our sample period, the PS surveys
included some changes in their population designs resulting in an unbalanced
panel of the entire population. As a result, we cannot distinguish whether
the entry or exit rates of ﬁrms resulted from survey response behavior or real
economic structural behavior. The number of ﬁrms (Nj) for each NACE rev.
1 industry is calculated by Statistics Netherlands. Table ?? in Appendix C
reports the sectors that were chosen with a corresponding NACE two-digit
code and the corresponding number of ﬁrms.
3.1 Empirical results for the complete sample of Dutch
rms
Table 1 reports the means, medians, standard deviations, and ﬁrst and third
quartiles of the included data for our main variables. A summary of the
aggregate annual growth of all inputs and output along with input shares in
revenue is presented. During 1989-2005, the gross output and the material
input grew at a rate of about 1.7 and 1.9 percent annually, respectively. The
annual capital growth rate is dramatically higher than the labor growth rate,
implying increased capital intensity over time. However, the capital input
constitutes only 4.9 percent of gross output on the average, while the mean
share of labor is almost 28 percent, and intermediate inputs constitute more
than half of gross output (60.65 percent on the average). Moreover, the
dispersion of all these variables is considerably large.
As we deﬁned TFPG consisting of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc growth rate, ai, a period
speciﬁc growth rate, δt, plus a white noise, uit that might be correlated with
the ﬁrm’s input choices, estimating equation (10) by means of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimates might be inconsistent and biased.
The estimation of a panel data model with predetermined variables is
typically done by means of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) es-
timators applied to the ﬁrst diﬀerences transformation of the equation of
interest, where the available lags of the predetermined variables are used as
instruments. The purpose of this approach is to remove time-invariant un-
observed individual heterogeneity. Therefore, under the assumption that the
8In the original dataset, capital growth rates ranged from -359163 % to 802664 %. By
choosing cut-oﬀ values of -7.69 % and 26.69 %, we kept data between the 10th and the
90th percentile, respectively.
10Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
mean st.dv. p25 median p75
∆yit 0.017 0.174 -0.060 0.015 0.098
∆mit 0.019 0.229 -0.080 0.015 0.124
∆kit 0.076 0.087 0.001 0.066 0.144
∆lit 0.000 0.128 -0.046 0.000 0.047
siMt 0.606 0.148 0.511 0.609 0.705
siKt 0.049 0.042 0.023 0.040 0.064
siLt 0.278 0.131 0.185 0.267 0.356
∆xit 0.019 0.153 -0.050 0.014 0.086
sit 0.953 0.096 0.890 0.942 0.983
T/ﬁrm 4.3 1.8 2 4 6
Note: ∆xit ≡ siKt∆kit + siLt∆lit + siMt∆mit; the number of time observations per ﬁrm
varies between 2 and 16 years (30660 obs. for 7161 ﬁrms); p25 and p75 are the 25th and
the 75th percentile, respectively.
current random shocks are serially uncorrelated9 and deﬁning wit ≡ (∆xit,
(sit−1)∆lit)′, the orthogonality conditions can be written as E(wit−juis) = 0,
for j = 2,3...,T. The instruments we use are therefore lagged values of ∆xit
and (sit − 1)∆lit from (t − 2) and before. In addition, we also include time
dummies to capture possibly unobservable shocks common to all ﬁrms.
However, this approach yields inaccurate estimates in the case of a panel
with a small number of time periods with highly persistent data. In this
context, as has been stressed in Mairesse and Hall (1996), the application
of ﬁrst-diﬀerence GMM estimators with lagged levels of the series as instru-
ments has produced unsatisfactory results. More speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient
of the capital stock is generally low and statistically insigniﬁcant, and returns
to scale appear to be unreasonably low. Blundell and Bond (1999) suggest
that the problem of “weak instruments” is behind the poor performance of
standard GMM estimators in this context. This problem of weak instru-
ments can be overcome by applying an extended GMM estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995). This estimator, labeled as “system GMM”,
is based on an augmented system which includes level equations with lagged
diﬀerences as instruments in addition to the equations in diﬀerences with
lagged levels as instruments.
9When a variable is predetermined, the current period error term uit is uncorrelated
with current and lagged values of the predetermined variable but may be correlated with
future values. An unpredictable technology shock will be uncorrelated with past (and
potentially current) production settings, but will surely be correlated with future ones.
11First, we focus on the manufacturing industry as a whole over the period
1989-2005, without looking at the potential heterogeneity in the mark-up
and the bargaining power parameters among sectors. Estimation results for
the entire manufacturing market are reported in Table 2 and are organized in
two parts. The ﬁrst three columns display the estimated structural param-
eters of our estimating equation (10) for a range of estimators (level OLS,
ﬁrst-diﬀerence OLS, ﬁrst-diﬀerence GMM). The last two columns report the
results of estimating a dynamic speciﬁcation of equation (10), allowing for
an autoregressive component in the productivity shocks.
The ﬁrst section of each part of the table gives the estimated price-cost
mark-up   µ, the corresponding rent sharing   ϕ and the estimated scale elastic-
ity   θ.10 The second and the third sections present production function coeﬃ-
cient estimates assuming perfect competition in the output market (µit = 0)
and in the labor market (ϕit = 0), respectively.
In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 2 (OLS and ﬁrst-diﬀerence OLS ) we
observe that the derived price-cost markups are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 1 and the corresponding extent of rent sharing are quite small (respec-
tively 0.268 and 0.278). Furthermore, both level OLS and ﬁrst-diﬀerence
(FD) OLS11 suggest decreasing returns to scale. The main drawbacks to
these estimators are that part of the information in the data is left unused.
A ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator uses only the across time variation, which tends to
be much lower than the cross-section one for not particularly persistent data.
Second, the assumption that the ﬁrm’s speciﬁc attributes are ﬁxed over time
may not always be reasonable. Although biased, OLS estimators of the Hall
(1988) approach, which assumes an allocative wage (ϕit = 0), generates a
limited downward bias of price-cost markups (from 0.994 to 0.991 for the
level OLS and from 0.988 to 0.985 for the FD OLS) and an upward bias of
return to scale parameters (from 0.905 to 0.926 and from 0.884 to 0.921 for
level OLS and FD OLS respectively). Intuitively, the underestimation of the
markups, ignoring imperfect competition in the labor market, corresponds
to the omission of the part of product rents captured by the workers, which
are hidden in a larger scale parameter. On the other hand, when holding the
markups ﬁxed at 1, the rent sharing parameter slightly increases.
As stressed above, the OLS methods tend to underestimate the struc-
tural coeﬃcients when the error term of the production function is expected
10We use equation (7) to retrieve the parameter   θ. The standard errors of   ϕ and   θ are
computed using the delta method (Greene, 1993).
11The two estimators give us more or less the same results as a consequence of estimating
a static model. However, the FD estimator has the weaker exogeneity assumption that
permits future values of production factors to be correlated with the error. This results
in a light downwards bias of the markup and elasticity of scale.
12Table 2: General results for all 22 industries
STATIC DY NAMIC
LEV EL OLS FD OLS FD GMM FD GMM SY S GMM
  ϕ
0.268 0.278 0.614 0.434 0.319
(0.044) (0.058) (0.054) (0.024) (0.035)
  µ 0.994 0.988 1.063 1.010 1.026
(0.006) (0.008) (0.026) (0.013) (0.012)
  θ
0.905 0.884 0.993 0.894 0.906




Hp: µ = 1
  ϕ
0.269 0.278 0.621 0.4202 0.453
(0.044) (0.057) (0.056) (0.024) 0.057
  θ
0.910 0.909 0.910 0.887 0.880




Hp: ϕ = 0
  µ
0.991 0.985 1.044 0.988 1.034
(0.006) (0.008) (0.027) (0.008) (0.059)
  θ
0.926 0.921 0.976 0.924 0.952




Test of overidentifying restrictions χ2





Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample period 1989-2005; dependent variable: out-
put growth ∆yit
13to inﬂuence the choice of factor inputs and when the data do not exhibit a
persistent structure (i.e., the across time variation is much lower than the
cross-section one). Despite the signal of non persistency, we estimate a dy-
namic panel data model by considering an AR(1) extension of (10) and report
the estimated coeﬃcients in the second part of Table 2 (columns 4 and 5).
We report results for the two-step GMM estimator for both the ﬁrst diﬀer-
enced equations (FD GMM) and the system (SYS GMM). Year dummies
have been included in both models.
At a ﬁrst glance, it is clear that the AR(1) structure that we assume for
the idiosyncratic error term is not needed, as the coeﬃcient φ of the lagged
dependent variable is statistically not signiﬁcant for the system GMM, and
although statistically signiﬁcant for the FD GMM, it is approximately equal
to zero in this case. Nevertheless, the gains of the system GMM estimation,
claimed to be a more robust estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1999), compared with the FD GMM estimates, are not very ap-
parent in terms of an economically meaningful interpretation. All structural
parameters behave similarly to the OLS estimators.12 The markups equal
to 1 and the corresponding bargaining power parameters are slightly larger
(0.434 and 0.319, respectively, for FD and system GMM). Accounting for
imperfect competition on the labor market yields to larger returns to scale
than assuming perfect competition.
FD GMM estimates of equation (10) are displayed in the third column of
Table 2. The parameter of bargaining power   ϕ is very high (0.614), reﬂecting
the inﬂuence of labor behavior on output growth. Nevertheless, taking into
account the existence of rent sharing translates in a rise in the estimated
markup   µ (from 1.044 to 1.063) and in the estimated elasticity of scale   θ
(from 0.976 to 0.993). Our last estimation technique allows us to draw some
conclusions for the Dutch manufacturing industries. In particular, we ﬁnd
some evidence of imperfect competition on the output market and strong
union’s power on the labor market. Markups are signiﬁcantly and fairly
larger than one and returns to scale are constant or moderately decreasing,
in the range of 0.9 to 1.0.
12To show the inapplicability of a dynamic panel data model to our data, we estimated
the parameters of interest in the steady state equilibrium. Results displayed in Table
?? of Appendix C corroborate our propensity for a static model. Indeed, the steady
state markup µ is smaller both in the FD GMM and the system GMM (0.976 and 1.012
respectively).
143.2 Across-Industry Estimates
Since ﬁrm’s production behavior is very likely to vary even across industries,
we also investigate across-industry ﬁrm heterogeneity in estimated markup
and rent-sharing parameters.
For 22 industries, we estimate equation (10) with and without the ex-
tension to labor imperfections, by means of the FD GMM estimator as this
allows us to provide a plausible economic interpretation and it is a robust
estimation technique. As instruments we take an appropriate number of
lagged levels. Year dummies are always included. The estimated parameters
are reported in Table 3.
Results show that for all industries, the magnitude of the estimated
markup, elasticity of scale and bargaining power are likely to vary among
industries. The price cost margin µ is estimated to be lower than 1.01 for
the ﬁrst quartile of industries and higher than 1.16 for the top quartile. How-
ever, almost all industries reveal constant or increasing returns to scale (that
is likely to be the case for manufacturing industries).
Within-industry imperfect competition on the labor market is present in
13 sectors. Then we reshape our results, by considering two subsamples.
The ﬁrst subsample (Table 4) includes the estimates showing evidence of
perfect competition on the output market (price-cost markup less than or
equal to 1). The second subsample (Table 5) contains the estimates of those
sectors for which the price-cost markup exceeds 1.13 Moreover, each table
has two extra columns where we consider subsamples of sectors. The ﬁrst
extra column displays results for industries where the extent of rent sharing
is found to be signiﬁcant and bounded between 0 and 1 (µ ≤ 1 and ϕ ̸= 0).
The second subsample includes the estimates for those sectors showing no
evidence of rent sharing (µ ≤ 1 and ϕ = 0).
Estimates of Table 4 are in line with what we found up to now. Taking
into account the existence of rent sharing increases the estimated markup
µ. This result is further conﬁrmed by the subsample of 4263 ﬁrms for which
the bargaining power was found to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
consequent decrease in the estimated elasticity of scale θ due to a reallocation
of resources is more apparent in the second part of Table 4 (i.e., the two
extra columns), where from a decreasing returns to scale (0.822) we move
to an approximately constant elasticity of 0.95. Furthermore, we ﬁnd strong
evidence of large union’s power (0.611 for all sectors where µ ≤ 1 and 0.65
for the ﬁrst subsample).
However, the 5 sectors for which estimates are reported in Table 5 behave
13According to Table 3, the selected sectors that exhibit µ > 1 (signiﬁcance at 5%) are
29, 30, 33, 34, 35.
15Table 3: FD GMM estimates for 22 industries
NACE Hp:ϕ = 0
  ϕ   µ   θ ∆a   µ   θ N.obs(T/ﬁrm)
15
1.305 1.031 1.251 0.02 1.018 0.951 1168(3.8)
(0.891) (0.042) (0.847) (0.042) (0.039)
16
0.143 1.107 1.019 0.47 1.119 1.047 16(3.8)
(0.089) (0.168) (0.156) (0.205) (0.192)
17
0.288 1 0.887 1.51 1.042 0.974 286(3.6)
(0.185) (0.044) (0.103) (0.108) (0.101)
18
0.693 0.977 0.780 5.53 0.853 0.825 142(2.8)
(0.092) (0.035) (0.067) (0.064) (0.152)
19
0.307 0.958 0.961 7.02 1.014 0.948 83(3.4)
(0.033) (0.152) (0.924) (0.130) (0.122)
20
-0.495 0.982 0.933 0.49 0.984 0.920 262(3.7)
(7.333) (0.098) (0.190) (0.089) (0.083)
21
0.647 1.118 1.187 1.46 1.035 0.967 289(4.0)
(0.135) (0.162) (0.204) (0.091) (0.085)
22
0.825 1.330 1.346 -0.87 1.073 1.003 840(3.5)
(0.045) (0.213) (0.211) (0.213) (0.199)
23 15(2.6)
24 0.761 1.025 1.054 1.49 0.994 0.929 508(3.9)
(0.068) (0.094) (0.100) (0.092) (0.086)
25 0.708 1.182 1.223 0.72 1.023 0.956 540(3.3)
(0.113) (0.119) (0.117) (0.049) (0.046)
26 0.579 1.169 1.294 1.42 1.077 1.007 428(4.2)
(0.083) (0.112) (0.196) (0.088) (0.082)
27 1.207 0.946 0.936 2.46 0.975 0.912 146(4.6)
(0.741) (0.086) (0.077) (0.052) (0.048)
28 0.697 1.020 1.070 -0.30 1.013 0.947 1391(3.6)
(0.073) (0.040) (0.059) (0.040) (0.038)
29
0.789 1.238 1.339 -0.68 1.229 1.148 1047(3.1)
(0.128) (0.086) (0.094) (0.065) (0.061)
30
0.903 1.720 1.727 8.77 1.341 1.254 36(2.4)
(0.019) (0.166) (0.165) (0.152) (0.142)
31
-1.275 1.009 0.967 0.88 1.004 0.967 265(3.4)
(3.457) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
32
1.468 1.047 1.031 5.94 1.196 1.118 69(2.4)
(0.929) (0.189) (0.173) (0.057) (0.053)
33
0 .906 1.130 1.137 -0.50 1.035 0.967 250(3.2)
(0.034) (0.065) (0.065) (0.080) (0.075)
34
0.798 1.324 1.344 3.02 1.341 1.282 210(3.6)
(0.450) (0.087) (0.141) (0.093) (0.089)
35
0.666 1.151 1.208 -2.98 1.102 1.031 217(3.2)
(0.146) (0.047) (0.092) (0.039) (0.036)
36
0.602 1.045 1.161 -0.10 1.046 0.978 454(3.4)
(0.079) (0.077) (0.163) (0.077) (0.072)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample period 1989-2005; dependent variable: out-
put growth ∆yit; ∆a is the average TFPG.
16Table 4: 17 Sectors where   µ ≤ 1
  µ ≤ 1   µ ≤ 1 and   ϕ ̸= 0   µ ≤ 1 and   ϕ = 0
    ϕ
0.611 0.650
(0.059) (0.054)
    µ
1.022 1.034
(0.027) (0.035)
    θ
0.847 0.822
(0.022) (0.028)
Hp: ϕ = 0
    µ
1.000 1.007
(0.028) (0.045)
    θ
0.933 0.950
(0.026) (0.043)
N.ﬁrms 6052 4263 2165
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample period 1989-2005; dependent variable: out-
put growth ∆yit
diﬀerently. Including the rent sharing slightly reduces the level of imperfect
competition from 1.254 to 1.231. This result is in contrast with some empir-
ical ﬁndings (Krueger and Summers, 1987, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989).
A possible interpretation could be that workers will tend to gain higher wage
rents in those sectors where there is less competition, which in turn generates
a surplus, to which workers have a claim of a share. In other words, workers’
unions power, and in general rigidities of the labor market, will aﬀect ﬁrms’
marginal cost, and, consequently, the markups.
Therefore, rigidities and frictions in the labor market might be crucial for
understanding ﬁrms’ behavior. To the extent that wages are allocative, we
ﬁnd that labor market frictions are the key factor. However, the exact form
of these frictions remains still ambiguous and will be a stimulus to carry on
further research.
4 Impact on TFPG
Introducing imperfect competition on both output and labor markets, we
see that changes in the level of competition vary by industry. This section
incorporates these ﬁndings to analyze the relationship between imperfect
competition, variable returns to scale, and productivity growth.
17Table 5: 5 Sectors where   µ > 1
  µ > 1   µ > 1 and   ϕ ̸= 0   µ > 1 and   ϕ = 0
    ϕ
0.566 0.574
(0.323) (0.321)
    µ
1.231 1.210
(0.082) (0.093)
    θ
1.063 1.035
(0.071) (0.081)
Hp: ϕ = 0
    µ
1.254 1.341
(0.066) (0.093)
    θ
1.179 1.282
(0.062) (0.089)
N.ﬁrms 1681 1498 210
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample period 1989-2005; dependent variable: out-
put growth ∆yit
The eﬀect of markups on TFPG, measured in a growth accounting frame-
work, has been addressed in a number of related papers.14 Azzam et al.
(2004) decompose sources of TFPG by economies of scale, markups, and
demand growth. Using US food industry data for 1973-1992, these authors
ﬁnd that, on average, productivity grew by 0.22% due to markups and 0.10%
due to increases in economies of scale. Morrison (1992) ﬁnds that the TFPG
adjusted for markups in total manufacturing has increased during 1960-1981
for Japan, the US, and Canada. It is also noted that variable returns to
scale tend to neutralize the implications of the markup adaptation. Harri-
son (1994) measures changing markups and productivity of manufacturing
ﬁrms in the Cˆ ote d’Ivoire. Annual TFPG measured as a T¨ ornquist index
number formula, (i) rises from 0.4% to 1.4% under the assumption of perfect
competition and constant returns to scale, (ii) rises from 0.5% to 1.4% if
the assumption of perfect competition is relaxed, and (iii) if both assump-
tions are relaxed, productivity growth rises from 0.6% to 1.8%. Kee (2004)
ﬁnds that the average annual growth rate of the productivity of Singapore’s
14We note that there is also another strand of literature that (usually through regres-
sions) looks immediately at the eﬀect of competition and broader deﬁnitions of economic
performance (including productivity). For a comprehensive survey of empirical studies,
see Nickell (1996). The author concludes that the empirical evidence for the relation is
not convincing.
18Table 6: Averages of TFPG (%)
All sectors Sectors where   µ > 1 Sectors where   µ ≤ 1
Hp: Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
I 0.95 0.93 2.30 1.50 0.94 0.91
II 1.00 1.00 2.60 2.40 1.03 1.04
III -0.20 -0.10 0.02 0.23 -0.26 -0.16
IV -0.73 -0.61 -0.47 -0.27 -0.78 -0.26
Note: I: ϕ ∈ (0,1]; II: ϕ = 0; III: ϕ = 0,µ = 1; IV: ϕ = 0,θ = µ = 1; TFP percentage
growth rates are calculated as residuals (FD GMM).
manufacturing sector from 1974 to 1992 is 7% while the TFP index takes im-
perfect competition and non-constant returns to scale into account, whereas
the TFPG is less than 3% by conventional measurement.
In a recent study, Van der Wiel and Van Leeuwen (2003) ﬁnd evidence of
an opposite eﬀect in the (market) service sector when the TFPG is adjusted
by a markup ignoring economies of scale. Based on ﬁrm-level data between
1994-1999; their study ﬁnds that the modiﬁed TFPG is 0.2% higher than the
traditional TFPG.
In Table 6, we summarize our estimation results. In particular, when
adopting the conventional framework of perfect competition and constant
return to scale, the residually estimated productivity growth is -0.73 per-
cent. When relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale, the average
(across years) TFP growth rate for all industries rises to -0.20. Moreover, in-
troducing imperfect competition on the output market dramatically increases
the productivity growth (1%). This ﬁnding is in line with the majority of
models of endogenous growth (e.g Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Indeed, a decrease of the level of product
market competition has a positive eﬀect on productivity growth, by aug-
menting the monopoly rents that reward innovations.
Furthermore, connected to the innovation process and labor market im-
perfections, as in Aghion and Howitt (1994), we ﬁnd that labor market imper-
fection results in a lower productivity growth rate (TFPG slightly decreases
to 0.95 percent). As a matter of fact, ﬁrms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks
due to innovations that are implicitly asking for labor force reallocations. La-
bor reallocation inﬂuences the productivity growth rate, as it determines the
speed with which resources are moved around to the most proﬁtable ﬁrms.
As rigidity of the labor market does not allow ﬁrms from adjusting their
labor factor, labor market imperfection then causes a lower innovation rate.
As in the previous section, we reshape our results, by considering two sub-
19samples. One sample contains the estimates of those sectors for which the
price-cost markup exceeds 1 and the other subsample considers the sectors
showing evidence of perfect competition on the output market (price-cost
markup less than or equal to 1). As expected, the average TFPG is remark-
ably higher for the ﬁrst subsample of sectors (2.3%) than for the second one,
where the mean TFPG is approximately the same as for the whole sample
(0.94%). We also ﬁnd that this downward eﬀect on TFPG is particularly
remarkable for those ﬁrms exhibiting higher markups. As a further anal-
ysis, we take into account the possibility of correlation between class size
(number of employees) and productivity growth. Figure ?? in Appendix C
shows no evidence of a distinct relationship between class size and TFPG.
LOWESS15 estimates of TFP growth rates for all sectors are graphed (Figure
?? in Appendix C), aiming at discerning a distinct pattern over time. Some
industries clearly show a positive trend in the productivity growth; there-
fore, a non parametric test16 to detect a signiﬁcant trend over time is carried
out. According to the results of Table ?? in Appendix C, only 4 out of 22
sectors have a signiﬁcant trend at 5%. Food, beverages and tobacco, leather
products, and motor vehicles exhibit a positive trend, while paper products,
publishing and printing shows a decrease in TFPG .
5 TFPG based on an Alternative Measure of
Competition
It is important to have indicators that measure market power in an unam-
biguous way. In the theoretical framework used to derive the markup measure
of competition we did not account for possible dynamic eﬀects caused by dif-
ferences in eﬃciency. Indeed, there may also be problems that are inherent
to the markup measure of competition. Using price-cost margins alone to
assess market power can be misleading, because its theoretical robustness
has been challenged by some authors (see Boone, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2004,
and 2008; Amir, 2002; H¨ olzl, 2006; Koeniger and Licandro, 2006; and Boone
et al., 2005 and 2007). Therefore, it is possible that the markup distorts the
picture of competition. Problems are twofold.
First, measures based on price-cost margins such as the markup have a
tendency of cyclical behavior, especially in markets where goods are symmet-
15The LOWESS smooth technique carries out locally-weighted time series smoothing
for both equispaced and non-equispaced data; LOWESS stands for “locally weighted scat-
terplot smoothing” (Cleveland, 1979).
16Cuzick’s trend test (1985) is an extension to a Wilcoxon-type test for trend across a
group of three or more independent random samples.
20rically diﬀerentiated and diﬀer in their marginal costs. As an illustration, if
ﬁrms’ costs fall, the price-cost margin goes up, falsely suggesting a change
in competition (Boone et al., 2007). Moreover, as is established by Boone
et al. (2007), a higher variance of the underlying cost distribution across
ﬁrms causes the price-cost margin to be less successful as a measure of com-
petition. Therefore, the cyclical behavior of the markup may not represent
actual changes in competition.
A second problem with the markup measure is that it does not account
for possible eﬀects of ineﬃciencies in production. In particular, in case ﬁrms
are heterogeneous over time with respect to eﬃciency of production, the
markup may be a poor indicator of competition. To see this, note that
there are two ways in which competition can be increased: (1) more entry
of ﬁrms and (2) more aggressive behavior by ﬁrms leading to a reallocation
of production towards the eﬃcient ﬁrms.17 The latter route may imply a
change in market share composition or a reduction in the total amount of
ﬁrms in case ineﬃcient ﬁrms are driven out of the market, indicating that
a concentration measure such as the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI)18
may point in the wrong direction. However, also a measure based on the
price cost margin, such as the markup, may prove to be a wrong guide. In
particular, because the allocation eﬀect causes an increase of the market share
of the eﬃcient ﬁrms, price-cost margins may increase (Boone et al., 2007). As
illustrated by Boone et al. (2005), the unweighted price-cost margin can give
a wrong impression of competition since it would falsely suggest a reduction
in competition in case a new entrant has a relatively high Lerner index and
hence low market share.
In a series of papers, Boone (1997, 2000, 2001, 2004, and 2008) and Boone
et al. (2005 and 2007)) suggest an alternative competition measure, based on
relative proﬁts, which is theoretically more robust to a diﬀerent parametriza-
tion of competition (e.g., number of ﬁrms, entry costs, interaction between
ﬁrms, and cost reductions). This measure uses the eﬀect of possible ineﬃcien-
cies in a ﬁrm’s production. In particular, the central idea of this alternative
measure is that (i) competition always raises the proﬁts of a more eﬃcient
ﬁrm relative to the proﬁts of less eﬃcient ﬁrms and (ii) a rise in competi-
17For evidence on the importance of the second eﬀect, consult Boone et al., 2007.











.The HHI index will change if there is a shift in market share among the
larger ﬁrms.
Exports of ﬁrm i are included in balance sheets of the ﬁrm. Hence the industry level
Yjt are generally higher than the national industry outputs.
21tion reduces the proﬁts of the least eﬃcient ﬁrms active in the market. The
reason is that the output of ineﬃcient ﬁrms is reallocated to more eﬃcient
ﬁrms. More precisely, the relative proﬁt measure captures the fact that, as
competition increases, ﬁrms are punished more severely in terms of proﬁts
for a drop in eﬃciency. In this sense, cost diﬀerentials are translated into
proﬁt diﬀerentials. In this way the selection eﬀect of competition arises: ”a
rise in competition separates eﬃcient ﬁrms from ineﬃcient ﬁrms by reducing
ineﬃcient ﬁrms’ proﬁts and thus forcing them to exit” (Boone (2000)).
Boone et al. ( 2007) ﬁnd that measures based on relative proﬁts and price-
cost margins are highly correlated and that both tend to give an accurate view
of competition. However, in situations where the reallocation eﬀect is strong,
i.e., in cases with few ﬁrms and high Herﬁndahl indexes, the measures deviate
suggesting that in these instances measures based on price-cost margins fall
short. Since this is likely to be relevant in the present study, we explicitly
take the relative proﬁt measure into account.
Boone’s measure takes into account the fact that over time there may
exist more eﬃcient ﬁrms (with lower marginal costs) that have lower prices
and higher proﬁts, price-cost margins, and market shares. In the Boone et
al. (2007) formulation for ﬁrm i = 1,2,...,N belonging to sector j at period
t = 1,2,...,T, logarithmic nominal proﬁts can be written as a function of
logarithmic unit nominal costs:
lnπijt = αij + δjt − βjt lncijt + εijt, (11)
where the ﬁxed eﬀects are given by αij and δjt = lnπjt + βjt lncjt with πjt
and cjt are the reference proﬁts and costs, respectively,19 and εijt are the
error terms related to the unobservable parts of individual proﬁts of the ﬁrm
in sector j.
Since less eﬃcient ﬁrms will have higher values of cit, it generally holds
that the ﬁrm in sector j with higher costs has lower proﬁts, or (in general)
βjt > 0. The estimated βjt elasticities measure to what extent cost eﬃciency
diﬀerentials are translated into proﬁt diﬀerentials, or in other words, ”in a
more competitive industry, ﬁrms are punished more harshly for being inef-
ﬁcient” (Boone, 2008, p. 1246). Hence, the values of βjt inform about the
19Substituting this expression for the ﬁxed eﬀects in (11), we directly observe that the
basic proﬁt function is expressed in relative terms:
ln πit
t = αi − βt ln cit
ct + εit.
The relationship between relative proﬁts and relative cost eﬃciencies should be either
expressed in terms of the most or the least eﬃcient ﬁrm.
22degree of monopoly or competition: as competition increases, the βjts become
larger (in absolute value).
Under the assumption that measurement problems (e.g. data aggrega-
tion, unobservable marginal costs) stay constant over time within an indus-
try, the relative proﬁt indicator should merely be used as a tool that analyzes
changes of competition over time within an industry.
Since Boone’s proﬁt elasticity is only given for sectors, we compare com-
petition indicators at the industry level, j. Boone et al. (2007) also report
the correlation of markups and relative proﬁts. Based on a sample of 43 UK
industries for 1986-1999, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive correlation for 20 in-
dustries. As already pointed out, Boone et al. (2007) ﬁnd that markups and
the relative proﬁt elasticities are highly correlated if the HHI is low. However,
the analysis comparing proﬁt elasticities with markups and their correspond-
ing HHI may be misleading, because it is claimed that each of these three
competition measures have a simultaneous relationship and other market de-
terminants may also be important. Therefore, we establish the relationship
between both measures controlling two important market characteristics. By
deriving this relation we can obtain an adjusted markup level that enters the
TFPG equation. In that sense, it allows us to measure the sensitivity of
TFPG to both competition indexes.
To establish this relationship, we run the regression,












  βj ⊙ Nj
)′
ωj5+δt+εj, (12)
where   µj are the estimated markups,   β′
j = (  βj1,   βj2,...,   βjT) are the relative
proﬁt’ elasticities that are derived from equation (11), H′
j = (Hj1,Hj2,...,HjT)
are the HHIs per industry j, and N′
j = (Nj1,Nj2,...,NjT) are changes in the
number of ﬁrms. Equation (12) simply relates the markups to other struc-
tural market variables, so that it may be reasonable to assume that the
impact of these market variables accounts for cyclical changes and other pos-
sible determinants. It is not straightforward how these variables will relate
to the markup measure. In standard theory, competition intensiﬁes as the
number of ﬁrms increases. This is based on the concept that an increase in
the number of ﬁrms is regarded as an increase in competition, which may
be due to lower barriers of entry. As a result of higher entry in the market,
it can easily be veriﬁed that the markup will decrease when the number of
ﬁrms increases. In general, the number of ﬁrms and the Herﬁndahl index are
inversely related: the markup will decrease if the Herﬁndahl index decreases.
Boone et al. (2007) have also pointed out that these eﬀects may be ambigu-
ous. An increase in competition by intensifying the number of ﬁrms may
raise the market shares of the eﬃcient ﬁrms at the cost of the ineﬃcient ones
23through the reallocation eﬀect. By this mechanism, the Herﬁndahl index
may increase contradicting standard theory. In addition, it is also claimed
that markups and relative proﬁt elasticities are highly correlated at low con-
centration. We therefore also control for some interaction eﬀects where the
Herﬁndahl indexes and the number of ﬁrms act like moderators.
The results for Dutch ﬁrms are discussed in the next section.
6 Data and Estimation Results
We note that the unbalanced nature of our panel data is caused by the
diﬀerent numbers of ﬁrms for each sector j and time t. The changing number
of ﬁrms may be induced by either market exit or entry rates or some ﬁrms
may not have been included in the PS statistics for a particular year. We
note that large ﬁrms have always been included in the population surveys
of the Dutch PS. However, lack of data did not allow us to distinguish one
of these underlying reasons for the changing number of ﬁrms. Consequently,
we matched the HHI to two alternative measures. First, we follow Nickell
(1996) by deﬁning the total sales as the average sales of ﬁrm i in industry j
at time t multiplied by the number of ﬁrms in industry j chosen in a base
year. The number of ﬁrms is kept constant over the years to correct for the
changing ﬁrm base of the sample. The method of keeping the number of ﬁrms
across time constant (for example by a base period, see Nickell, 1997) did not
aﬀect the results. As a second robustness check, we also ﬁnd that our HHIs
are very highly correlated (for matching sectors) with those computed from
the Dutch National Accounts, based on an adjustment using a population
raising factor to their sample.
Data on measuring proﬁts and costs come directly from the Dutch PS.
Proﬁts are available as a separate variable reported by each of the ﬁrms
collected in the survey. In the relative proﬁts’ competition indicator, costs
are deﬁned in terms of marginal costs (see Boone, 2000 - conjecture 1).
However, it is diﬃcult to measure marginal costs directly. To overcome this
problem, Boone et al. (2007) measure a ﬁrm’s cost eﬃciency by dividing
total variable costs (WitLit + ZitMit) by revenue, CitYit/Pit(Yt)Yit, where
Cit is the ﬁrm’s nominal marginal cost (for one unit of real output). Since
the Yit terms cancel out, this measure is equivalent to Cit/Pit(Yt), which is
merely the unit marginal cost normalized by the output price Pit(Yt). Data
for 22 dutch manufacturing sectors are again ranging from 1989 to 2005.
Summary statistics on the variables involved in estimating equation (12)
and equation.(11) are reported in Table 7. Boone et al. (2007) ﬁnd that on
average over 250 Dutch markets over the period 1993-2002 βjt equals 7. Our
24Table 7: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
  µjt 321 1.118 0.186 0.87 1.72
Hjt 336 0.130 0.204 0.004 0.913
Njt 336 0.805 0.135 0.376 1
  βjt 337 9.274 2.788 4.502 16.600
cit 30660 0.884 0.103 0.066 1.884
πit ≥ 0 27339 7.155 1.697 0 14.774
Note:   µjt is the estimated markup for sector j at time t; Hjt is the HHI per industry j
at time t; Njt ∈ [0,1] measures the changes in the number of ﬁrms in sector j;   βjt is the
estimated proﬁt elasticity per sector; cit are the costs for ﬁrm i at time t; πit is the log of
proﬁts > 0.
data report evidence of a more intense imperfect competition:   βjt is equal to
9.3, that is a one percent increase in costs leads to a 9.3 percent reduction
in proﬁts. However, there is substantial variation in   βjt, and the patterns of
the estimated slope parameter change over time (see Figure ?? in Appendix
C). The high proﬁtability present in the manufacturing market attracts new
ﬁrms, and results in a growth of number of ﬁrms Njt (80.5%). However, the
measure of concentration Hjt points at a moderate (ranging between 0.10
and 0.18) level of competition. Our empirical model (12) is estimated with
linear instrumental variables regression (IV) on Dutch manufacturing ﬁrms
that report non-negative proﬁts.20
We are interested in the impact that an encompassing measure of com-
petition would have on the productivity growth. Therefore, we plug the
systematic part of equation (12) in equation (10) to see whether an empir-
ically more robust measure of competition will aﬀect the magnitude of the
other structural parameters. Table 8 shows quite sizable diﬀerences. The av-
erage of the empirical markup over time is higher (1.09) than the FD GMM
estimate of µit (1.06). Nevertheless, with the new adapted markup we ﬁnd
moderately decreasing returns to scale, 0.90, while with the classical spec-
iﬁcation of the competition measure we could not reject the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale. However, the TFPG seems not to be aﬀected by
the diﬀerent speciﬁcation, as it is found to be 0.97 percent. A paired t-test
reveals that the mean diﬀerences between productivity calculated with the
classical speciﬁcation of markup (0.95) and productivity estimated taking
into account the inclusion of the adapted markup (0.97) is not signiﬁcantly
20Firms with zero proﬁts are included in the sample, since we considered the logarithm
of one in such case.
25Table 8: Estimates of eq. (10) using the ”adjusted markup” of eq. (8)
  ϕ   µ   θ N.
eq.(8)
0.614 1.063 0.993 7161
(0.054) (0.026) (0.025)
0.631 1.090 0.898 7161
eq.(10) with   µjt of eq. (12)
(0.050) (0.010) (0.034)
Note: Std. err. in parentheses; sample period 1989-2005; dependent variable: output
growth ∆yit.
diﬀerent from zero. Hence, adding more structure to the competition measure
does not tell us anything more on productivity change. A possible conclusion
could be that the speciﬁcation of a the output growth according to equation
(10) already covers the mechanism of competition between ﬁrms and work-
ers. Taking into account both competition on the output market and on the
labor market is a more complete description of what is considered by the
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm. Indeed, including frictions and rigidities of the labor
market in the production function, already corrects for that part of proﬁts
that would result in a higher gain for the ﬁrm. If proﬁts are balanced between
ﬁrms and workers, the resulting markups will be then already corrected for
eﬃciency gains. Therefore, the proﬁt elasticity does not add information on
eﬃciency as this is implicitly, but already included in our model (10).
As a matter of fact, estimates of the empirical model reported in equation(13)
below, validate our ﬁnding of scarce contribution of the proﬁt elasticity in
adding elements to market behavior analysis. The estimated empirical rela-
tionship (standard errors in parentheses, time dummy included) is therefore
reported:
    µj = −.068
(0.032)






  βj ∗Hj +0.076
(0.039)
  βj ∗Nj (13)
In line with the IO literature, an increase on the number of ﬁrms (Nj) has
a downward eﬀect on the markup. The negative coeﬃcient of the Herﬁndhal
index is consistent to what is expected. An increase in concentration leads
to a reduction of price-cost margins. Average marginal eﬀects are then com-
puted. The marginal eﬀect of the proﬁt elasticity   βj is found to be -0.0003
and statistically signiﬁcant only at 25%; the average marginal eﬀect of Hj is
-0.025, and that of Nj is -0.21 (both signiﬁcant at 5 percent). However, these
results are generally consistent with both theory and Boone et al. ﬁndings,
in the sense that coeﬃcients have the expected negative signs.
267 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore both theoretically and empirically a framework
where we integrate possible labor market rigidities and output market be-
havior on total factor productivity growth (TFPG) measure. We consider
market power measured by the traditional markup, and we propose an al-
ternative markup proxy, that should capture possible eﬀects of ineﬃciencies
in production. This adapted markup relates the classical markup to relative
proﬁt elasticities, the Herﬁndahl index, and other market structural variables.
Embedding Hall’s (1990) eﬃcient bargaining model, which introduces a
substantial degree of labor market imperfections, we show that rigidities and
frictions in the labor market might be crucial for understanding the ﬁrms’
marginal costs and their price setting behavior. We apply this analysis to 22
industries in Dutch manufacturing for the period 1989-2005.
By comparing a range of estimators (level OLS, ﬁrst-diﬀerence OLS, ﬁrst
diﬀerence GMM, Arellano and Bond, Blundell and Bond), we estimate a
standard production function, allowing for an autoregressive component in
the productivity shocks.
We show some evidence of imperfect competition on the output market
and strong union’s power on the labor market. Markups are signiﬁcantly
and fairly larger than one and returns to scale are constant or moderately
decreasing, in the range of 0.9 to 1.0. On the other hand, our data do not
support the AR(1) structure that we assume for the idiosyncratic error term.
The variation of imperfect competition across sectors is then large. The
price-cost margin is lower than 1.01 for the ﬁrst quartile of industries and
higher than 1.16 for the top quartile. Workers’ union power also takes val-
ues that range from 0.143 to 0.903, while returns to scale are likely to be
homogeneously constancy across sectors.
To the extent that wages are allocative, we ﬁnd that labor market imper-
fections play a main role in either determining the market behavior and in
assessing the correct TFPG.
When adopting the conventional framework of perfect competition and
constant return to scale, the estimated productivity growth is -0.7 %, while
when relaxing it, the average TFPG for all industries rises to -0.02 %. Then,
introducing imperfect competition on the output market dramatically in-
creases the productivity growth (1%). Hence, a decrease of the level of
product market competition has a positive eﬀect on productivity growth.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that labor market imperfection leads to a lower pro-
ductivity growth rate (TFPG decreases to 0.95%).
On the other hand, the TFPG does not seem to be sensitive to our al-
ternative speciﬁcation of the markup, as TFPG is found to be of the same
27magnitude of the one calculated with the classical speciﬁcation of markups.
We conclude that adding more structure to the competition measure does
not add any information to productivity change and eﬃciency in general, as
this is indirectly included in the previous speciﬁcation.
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34A Varying markups and returns to scale in a
general setting
This Appendix presents a detailed analysis of the production function and
the TFPG set-up allowing for market imperfections and scale economies.
The derivation of markups, scale elasticities, and TFPG is based on a single-
output production technology.
In particular, we let each ﬁrm i ∈ {1,...N) face the following production
function for period t:
Yit = AitFi(Xit) i = 1,2,...N t = 1,...,T, (14)
where Yit measures ﬁrm i’s gross output, Xit ≡ (Xi1t,Xi2t,...,XiJit)′ de-
notes the vector of Ji nonnegative factor inputs, Fi(.) is the core of the
(diﬀerentiable) production function, and Ait is TFP measured as the rate
of a Hicks-neutral disembodied technology. Logarithmic diﬀerentiation of























How does imperfect competition enter (15)? Firms with market power
do not set their value of the marginal product, PitAit
∂Fi(·)
∂Xijt, equal to their
corresponding factor price. It is assumed that each ﬁrm i faces an inverse
demand function, Pit(Yt), which represents the market price as a function
of aggregate (industry) output Yt ≡
∑N
i=1 Yit, i.e., by specifying ﬁrm i’s
(output) price as an arbitrary function of aggregate output we allow for
various potential degrees of ﬁrm i’s market power on its output market.
Firm i’s optimization problem can be written as:
max
Yit,Xit
{Pit (Yt)Yit − V
′
itXit | Yit = AitFi(Xit)}, (16)
where Vit ≡ (Vi1t,Vi2t,...,ViJit)′ is ﬁrm i’s vector of Ji input prices. Assum-
ing, in the ﬁrst instance, that there is imperfect competition on the output
market and perfect competition on the input markets (a monopolistic ﬁrm
acting as a price-setter on its output market and a price-taker on its input
markets), the ﬁrst order conditions (FOCs) implied by the solution of (16)




















where, according to Diewert (1993) and Diewert and Fox (2004), the La-
grange multiplier P ∗
it is ﬁrm i’s shadow or marginal price of output under
proﬁt maximization and market power enables ﬁrm i to set each input’s
marginal product,
∂Yit














for k = 1,...,Ji, (18)
where the term between square brackets is ﬁrm i’s markup. Note that in case
of perfect competition
∂Pit(Yt)
∂Yt goes to zero, implying that prices are set at
marginal cost since marginal revenue (MRit) is (always) equal to marginal
cost (MCit) (or MRit = P ∗
it = MCit) and inputs are paid their marginal
products (markup equal to 1) then.












or the Lerner index as a measure of a monopolist’s market power is inversely







Pit(Yt) is ﬁrm i’s Lerner index or (relative) price-cost margin,
εit ≡ − ∂Yt
∂Pit(Yt)
Pit(Yt)
Yt is ﬁrm i’s elasticity of demand with respect to price, and
msit ≡
Yit
Yt is its market share. The Lerner index (20) is deﬁned in the range
of 0 ≤ ℓit < 1. Note that the markup (ratio) µit, which we deﬁne as the ratio
of output price over marginal (production) cost, can easily be related to the
Lerner index:
µit ≡ Pit/MCit = 1/(1 − ℓit) > 1, (21)
21The larger the elasticity of demand in absolute terms, the smaller the monopolistic
ﬁrm’s market power.
36so that it becomes clear that, if ﬁrm i is not perfectly competitive, then the












From (19) we obtain that the second FOC in (17) can be rewritten as:
Vit = Pit(Yt)(1 − ℓit)
∂Yit
∂Xit















where sikt denotes the share of the cost of input k in the total production
value of ﬁrm i, or sikt ≡ ViktXikt/[YitPit(Yt)], so that ﬁrm i’s total (factor)









Hence, following Ohinata and Plasmans (2002), ﬁrm i’s total input share is
found to be equal to the inverse of its average markup at period t, since the
latter can be deﬁned as the proﬁt ratio or the ratio of ﬁrm i’s output price












Yit . Equation (23)
says that the output elasticity of any individual input k equals the markup
times the share of input k in the total production value of ﬁrm i.
The returns to scale parameter θit measures the responsiveness of output
to an increase in all ﬁrm i’s inputs by a scalar factor λ at period t. Under the
homogeneity assumption of production function (14) we have that F(λXit) =
λθitF(Xit) with 0 < θit < ∞, where θit = 1 denotes constant returns to scale,
θit > 1 increasing returns to scale, and θit < 1 decreasing returns to scale.
37The time-varying, input-dependent returns to scale parameter, expressed as











Hence, under constant returns to scale,
∂F(λXit)
∂λ = F(Xit) and λ
F(λXit) =
1
F(λXit), or (26) implies θit = 1. By analogous reasoning, we ﬁnd variable
returns to scale implying θit ̸= 1. Since the elasticity of scale θit is equal to
the sum of all output elasticities with respect to inputs given by the sum
of equation (23) over all inputs, we can directly express this time-varying,
input-dependent elasticity of scale θit in (26) as the sum over all partial















so that, using the ﬁrst part of the last equality in (23) and taking account
of (16), (24), and (25), the time-varying markup in (21) can be rewritten as
the ratio between the time-varying, input-dependent elasticity of scale and











There are two important features of the markup involved in (28). First, it
allows for time-varying returns to scale. Under constant returns to scale and
constant markups, equation (28) is equivalent to the measure proposed by
Hall (1988). However, the assumption of the constant (or non-variable) re-
turns to scale restriction is a strong one that has received criticism from many
authors (e.g. Bresnahan (1988), Hylleberg and Jorgenson (1988), Chirinko
and Fazzari (1994), Klette (1999), Martins and Scarpetta (1999) and Aghion
et al. (2006)). Second, the markup measure in equation (28) is allowed to
vary over time. There are several possible factors that may cause cyclical
behavior of markups. Hall (1986) originally suggested that capacity uti-
lization ﬂuctuations are closely linked to markup levels. Domowitz et al.
(1988) found that markups are more pro-cyclical in concentrated than in less
concentrated US industries. Shapiro (1988) notes that demand elasticities
might aﬀect markups. Morrison (1994) takes into account a number of fac-
tors (economies of scale, utilization, unemployment, import prices) and ﬁnds
that estimated markups tend to increase over time and appear to be cyclical.
38In addition, Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) ﬁnd a strong correlation between
economies of scale and markups, which is obviously also implied by (28).
Several studies also relate markups to business cycles (e.g., Wu and Zhang
(2000) and Bloch and Olive (2001)). Although it is realistic to allow for
dynamic eﬀects in competition, one should be wary of the eﬀect of business
cycles on the markup since, as will be illustrated later, it may not reﬂect
changes in competition. This is one of the reasons we will also consider an
alternative measure of competition. The second reason is that the markup
may not be able to handle the dynamic eﬀects heterogenous eﬃciency has on
competition. Thus although the markup measure accurately reﬂects ﬁrm’s
proﬁts, its relation to competition is less clear-cut.
B Bargaining model
This Appendix provides the solution of Nash bargaining model and the
derivation of labor elasticity.
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]ϕit [Pit(Yt)Yit − WitLit − RitKit − ZitMit]
1−ϕit
is obtained by maximizing with respect to employment and to wage, and
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∂Lit ≡ riLt, we can rewrite equation (30) as:
Wit = riLt +
ϕit
Lit
(Pit(Yt)Yit − RitKit − ZitMit − riLt · Lit) (31)
Maximizing with respect to wage leads to:
∂
[
Lit(Wit − W it )





it ϕit(Wit − W it )









it ϕit(Wit − W it )




it (Wit −W it )
ϕit(1−ϕit)(Pit(Yt)Yit−WitLit−RitKit−ZitMit)
−ϕit·Lit
ϕit(Wit − W it )
−1(Pit(Yt)Yit − WitLit − RitKit − ZitMit) = (1 − ϕit)Lit
ϕit(Pit(Yt)Yit − WitLit − RitKit − ZitMit)
Lit
= (1 − ϕit)(Wit − W it )
−ϕitWit +
ϕit(Pit(Yt)Yit − RitKit − ZitMit)
Lit
= Wit −W it −ϕitWit+ϕitW it
Wit = (1 − ϕit)W it +
ϕit
Lit
(Pit(Yt)Yit − RitKit − ZitMit) (33)
40Combining the two FOCs (equation (29) and equation (32)), taking ac-
count of the markup (22) in the ﬁrst section of this Appendix, leads to the
reservation wage W it:































Once achieved the optimal reservation wage, we plug expression (34) in
expression (32), obtaining:
siLt = (1 − ϕit)θiLt
1
µit
+ ϕit(1 − siKt − siMt) (35)
where siLt, siKt and siMt denote the shares of labour cost in revenue,
WitLit
Pit(Yt)Yit,
capital cost in revenue,
RitKit
Pit(Yt)Yit, and intermediate goods cost in revenue,
ZitMit
Pit(Yt)Yit, respectively.





µitϕit(1 − siKt − siMt)
(1 − ϕit)
. (36)
equation (35) is derived by plugging expression (34) in expression (33).
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siLt = (1 − ϕit)θiLt
1
µit
+ ϕit(1 − siKt − siMt)























































Then, rearranging terms, the elasticity of labor can be expressed in terms
of the markup, µit, the elasticity of scale, θit and the degree of workers’
bargaining power ϕit,
θiLt = µitsiLt − ϕitµit + ϕitθit.
42Table 9: Steady-state equilibrium



















Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample period 1989-2005; dependent variable: out-
put growth ∆yit
C Tables and Figures
43Table 10: TFPG (%) per estimation method
Hp: I II III
OLS LEV EL
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.07 0.08 0.07
FD OLS
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00
FD GMM
Mean 0.95 1.00 0.83
Median 0.93 1.00 0.85
Note: I: ϕ ∈ (0,1]; II: ϕ = 0; III: ϕ = 0,µ = 1; TFP percentage growth rates are calculated
as residuals.
Table 11: Time trend test (per sector)
Industry 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26
z 1.96 -0.82 -2.07 6.10 1.23 -2.74 -1.22 -0.17 -0.25 -0.23
p − value 0.050 0.413 0.038 0.000 0.219 0.006 0.221 0.865 0.799 0.819
27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
-0.28 0.58 -1.03 0.85 0.82 -0.59 -0.71 -1.03 1.65 1.44
0.780 0.564 0.304 0.396 0.413 0.556 0.476 0.304 0.098 0.150



































44Table 12: NACE 2-digit code and number of ﬁrms
Code Sector Nj
15-16 Food, beverages, tobacco 2342
17 Textiles 584
18 Wearing apparel 518
19 leather 235
20 wood 666
21 paper products, publishing, printing 436
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 2095
23 coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 56
24 Chemicals and chemical products 902
25 rubber and plastic products 942
26 other non-metallic mineral products 793
27 Basic metals, Fabricated metal products 256
28 fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 3093
29 Machinery and equipment 2362
30 electrical and optical equipment 99
31 electrical machinery and apparatus 617
32 radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 224
33 medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 690
34 transport equipment 407
35 Motor vehicles and other 515
36 Other 1106
Tot 15976
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